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One could argue that there are few issues that have transcended the debates among U.S 
Supreme Court Justices to permeate the general fabric of society like the use of international 
norms in American jurisprudence. This hot button issue has captivated all aspects of government 
and has led to intense debates over the place of foreign influences in the interpretation of our 
constitution. The U.S Supreme Court Justices have engaged in the use and repudiation of foreign 
precedent. This can be seen in their written opinions as well as scholarly debates with one 
another at universities across the country. The United States Congress has also injected itself into 
the action, attempting to introduce broad legislation aimed at stifling the use of international 
norms. Former Congressman Tom Feeney of Florida signed onto several resolutions condemning 
the use of foreign authority in judicial opinions. He has argued that “[t]he people of the United 
States have never authorized…any federal court to use foreign laws to essentially make new law 
or establish some rights or deny rights here in the United States.”1 Not to be forgotten is 
scholarly commentary on the issue. While the use of international norms is certainly not 
something new to judicial interpretation, within the past 20 years the debate has come to a head.2 
It is now a frequent topic of scholarly writing on American jurisprudence as well as discussions 
of the jurisprudence of specific justices.  
 A common misunderstanding of the issue is what actually constitutes an international 
norm. When Justice Scalia argues that “modern foreign legal material can never be relevant to an 
interpretation of the meaning of the U.S. Constitution,”3 what is he referencing? Austen L. 
Parrish, an Associate Professor of Law at Southwestern Law School, addresses this issue in his 
                                                 
1 Tom Curry, A Flap Over Foreign Matters at the Supreme Court: House Members Protest the Use of Non-U.S. 
Rulings in Big Cases, MSNBC News, Mar. 11, 2004, http://msnbc.com/id/4506232 
2 I used the 20 year mark because I feel that Scalia has really brought the issue to the attention of people through his 
fervent disapproval. He was appointed in 86 so twenty years was a good mark.  
3 Cleveland, Sarah H. "Is There Room for the World in Our Courts?" The Washington Post 20 Mar. 2005. 5 Feb. 
2007 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A48939-2005Mar19.html>. 
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article “Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law.” He argues that it 
would be “foolish to suggest…that…foreign rulings are legally binding on American courts…” 
There is most assuredly a consensus that the courts are not suggesting we be bound by laws of 
other nations. It is commonly understood that the Unites States is a sovereign nation and that the 
only laws binding in the U.S. are U.S. laws, not laws of other countries. It is thus safe to argue 
that foreign law has no direct bearing on the interpretation of the United States Constitution. 
Now, this is not to say that foreign law is not taken into consideration by the justices when 
attempting to decide what is best for the people. The key is that foreign laws are not legally 
binding in the U.S. Justice John Paul Stevens summarized this idea best when he said: 
 
 It does seem to me that there is a vast difference between, on the one hand considering 
the thoughtful views of other scholars and judges-whether they be Americans or 
foreigners and whether they be state judges, federal judges or judges sitting in other 
countries-before making up our own minds, and on the other hand, treating international 
opinion as controlling our interpretation of our own law.4 
 
It is with the above justification that those who accept the use of international norms tend to 
include international laws as part of them. In summary, international law is included when 
referencing the practice of justices applying international norms to their jurisprudence in that the 
laws of foreign countries shape their understanding and consideration of the issue. International 
law is not included in the sense that it is not in any way viewed as binding in the U.S. Closely 
related to international laws are international treaties and other agreements in writing that have 
been codified by one or more countries. While, again, these are not binding in the U.S. (with the 
exception of, say, a treaty that the United States has signed), they do inform the opinions of the 
justices and are often taken into account by those justices who believe international norms are 
                                                 
4 John Paul Stevens, Justice Stevens Remarks, Seventh Circuit Judicial Conference Dinner 2, 8 (May 23, 2005)  
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important when interpreting the U.S. constitution. Justice Stevens, for example, has “cited 
foreign practice and multilateral treaties”5 in his written opinions.  
 In conjunction with international laws, treaties, and practices that are present 
when one references international norms, there is another concept included in the phrase that is 
commonly referred to as “standards of decency”6 or an “international consensus.”7 This is often 
the language used in opinions issued in “America’s culture wars [in]…the death penalty, 
abortion and gay rights.”8 It seems to be a growing trend in opinions issued by the Supreme 
Court to cite the overwhelming international majority. This majority is often found in the general 
beliefs of the human race and almost always references a moral standard. With the use of these 
tools in interpreting the constitution, the questions ultimately arises as to what exactly is the 
standard of decency or an international consensus and how could they possibly be measured with 
any degree of certainty as to make them legitimate. This is a growing concern among 
conservative members of the court who are disturbed by the “court’s apparent willingness to 
‘impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans’.”9 The choice in words of Justice 
Clarence Thomas when describing the use of an international consensus illustrates the frustration 
on the part of many who believe that this type of foreign influence has no place in the U.S. court 
system. The justices who invoke the use of an international standard of decency and its 
application to U.S. Constitutional interpretation believe that it is, in and of itself, enough to 
warrant its use. In other words, due to the fact that an international consensus has formed on an 
issue is enough to warrant its use in forming the opinions of the court. Former Justice Sandra 
                                                 
5 Treanor, William The Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens 74 FORDAM L. REV. 1557-1605 2005-2006 
6 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
7 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 605 
8 Cleveland, Sarah H. "Is There Room for the World in Our Courts?" The Washington Post 20 Mar. 2005. 5 Feb. 
2007 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A48939-2005Mar19.html>. 
9 Id 
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Day O’Connor has agreed that “the existence of an international consensus…can serve to 
confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American consensus.”10 This is in direct 
opposition to other members of the court like Scalia who argued that the reliance on “civilized 
standards of decency in other countries is totally inappropriate as a means of establishing the 
fundamental beliefs of [the U.S.].11 
Ultimately, the legitimacy behind the use of an international consensus relies on the 
definition of it. Measuring such things as standards of decency could be done most easily by 
looking at the foreign laws and practices of other countries and finding a majority opinion across 
a broad section. An example of this would be looking at laws for or against murder in a cross 
section of countries. I believe that there is no binding law in any country rewarding murder but 
there are definitely laws in every country punishing murder. Taking this simple evidence, it 
could be said that there is a definite consensus among the international community that murder is 
wrong. I would argue that this is the type of general consensus that the Supreme Court Justices 
reference when they are talking about an international consensus or a standard of decency. This, 
coupled with expressly written international laws, treaties, etc, encompasses the nature of 
international norms with reference to their use in the justice system of the U.S. While often 
called by one name or another, for the purposes of this paper, international law (used as 
described above by Justice Stevens), international consensuses, international standards of 
decency, and international norms will all refer to those foreign influences that have made their 
way into the jurisprudence of the American Justice System through the opinions of the Supreme 
Court Justices.  
                                                 
10 Roper v. Simmons, supra 6 
11 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and White, J., dissenting) 
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It is, however, somewhat ambiguous to reference the use of international norms without 
expressly citing where they appear and how they appear.  It has been stated previously that the 
use of international norms is present in many of the opinions written on such Supreme Court 
cases as abortion, gay rights, and the death penalty. These sensitive topics with the common 
element of humanity that can be understood in all countries lend themselves to be debatable on 
an international scale. In other words, punishment of a human, sexuality, and the right to life 
debates have a common moral quality that is present in all cultures. Because of this, these types 
of cases invite opinions that encompass international norms. Writing an opinion, however, is 
more than reviewing international dicta and drawing a conclusion. It can be compared to a 
complex mathematical proof, where the justice’s opinion on the issue is not good enough to 
change an existing law. While we do hold justices to a higher standard, they are citizens and 
have no more right to change a law based on opinion then you or I. The art is determining when 
the opinion is shared by enough citizens or states that it holds a significant weight to be upheld as 
a law. When looking for a national consensus, a justice can make connections through voting 
patterns, polls, and the overturning of past precedent pertaining to similar laws. Deciphering 
international opinion is considerably more difficult. In reading international laws, the justices 
must be aware of the government of that state, whether it is legitimate, and whether the mass 
population of the state is sufficiently represented in the government. This can be extremely time 
consuming when taking into account the courts’ docket and other responsibilities. 
   To circumvent this process slightly, the court has relied heavily on amicus curiae briefs 
as a means of flushing out national and international opinion. Amicus curiae briefs, or “friend of 
the court” briefs, have the intent of helping the courts obtain information.12 Simply put, 
                                                 
12 Behuniak, Susan Friendly Fire: amici curiae and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services pgs 179-192 in 
Slotnick, Elliot E., ed. Judicial Politics: Readings From Judicature. 3rd ed. CQ P, 2005 
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interested parties in the case submit documents containing information and reasoning as to why 
the court should vote their way on a certain issue.  In the case of determining national and 
international opinion, briefs are written on behalf of countries and large organizations within the 
United States. For example, if a right to life organization were arguing that abortion should be 
outlawed, they might conduct internally funded research on abortion practices in other countries. 
The group would then submit this information to the courts in hopes of bringing to light a 
consensus that was found to be in their favor.13  
 The court uses amicus curiae briefs as an informal information service. The U.S. 
government submits amicus curiae briefs in a majority of cases and these briefs have been shown 
to be an effective means for demonstrating a consensus of support for one side of the case. In a 
recent brief submitted to the Supreme Court of North Carolina on behalf of the European Union 
on a writ of certiorari for the case McCarver v. State of North Carolina, a growing international 
consensus in favor of the petitioner was cited. It then proceeded to justify this consensus with 
research.14 By providing the courts with briefs such as these, it makes determining a national or 
international consensus much easier. Because these briefs have become more readily available in 
recent years due to expedited communication through email and the internet, the use of 
international norms as justification for domestic laws has increased. 
The written opinions of the court and the amicus curie briefs that inform them are not the 
only instances where the debate over international norms has flourished. In more recent years, 
scholars have taken great interest in the evolution of the use of international norms in American 
Jurisprudence. What was once thought of as a new trend, the reference to foreign precedent has 
                                                 
13 Baum, Lawrence. The Supreme Court. 7th ed. Congressional Quarterly Books, 2000. 128-178. 
14 Wilson, Richard J. "Brief of Amicus Curiae The European Union In Support of the Petitioner." Washington 
College of Law, American University. 3 Mar. 2007 
<http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/McCarverEUAmicusCuriaeBr.doc>. 
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been traced back to the Declaration of Independence15 and the Federalist Papers16. A large part of 
the scholarly writing on the use of international norms has examined the instances of reference to 
them in documents starting with the founding of the United States and ending with present 
Supreme Court opinions. The misconception that this is a new phenomenon has come about for 
several different reasons. Perhaps the most convincing source was Justice Scalia himself, who 
“identifies the Court’s first use of foreign sources ‘for the purpose of interpreting the 
Constitution’ as the 1958 Eighth Amendment case of Trop v. Dulles…”17 Countering this were 
Justice Stevens’ remarks in Thompson v. Oklahoma, where he argued that the use of international 
norms in arguments involving the evolving standard of decency and the Eighth Amendment were 
not just traced back to the opinion of Chief Justice Earl Warren in Trop v. Dulles “but rather to a 
turn-of-the-century opinion of the Court.” This opinion, written in Weems v. United States, “held 
that the term ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ operated to invalidate a sentence [and was] 
derived from Spanish law…” Not withstanding this example from Weems, much of the basis for 
Scalia’s recent criticism has stemmed from the fact that he feels the Court has taken the practice 
of using international norms and injected into other cases beyond just those dealing with Eighth 
Amendment issues. While there is no doubt that the decision in Trop v. Dulles set a benchmark 
for the use of international norms, there is considerable evidence that the practice started at the 
inception of our nation.18 Much of our Constitution, as well as the Bill of Rights, is based off of 
the law and practice of England. This reliance on English interpretation and practice is very 
                                                 
15 Ginsburg, Looking Beyond, supra  6, at 14 
16 Cleveland, supra 8 
17  Cleveland, Sarah H. "Our International Constitution." 2006 The Yale Journal of International Law 31:1. 
HeinOnline. pg 5. (citing Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address at the American Society of International Law 
Proceedings: Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, in 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. (2004); see also 
Ann Gearan, Foreign Rulings Not Relevant to High Court, Scalia Says, Wash. Post, Apr. 3, 2004, at A07) 
18 supra 5 at 1601 
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present in the opinions of the Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.  
As stated above, the evidence for this has been found in numerous popular documents 
that are the basis for our country, not just in court opinions as the debate might lead one to 
believe. Sarah H. Cleveland, a Professor in Law at the University of Texas School of Law, 
argues that there are “cases where the Constitution expressly refers to international law or a 
concept of international law.”19 She uses this to argue that since international law seems to have 
informed our interpretation of the Constitution, it would make sense that it is cited in 
constitutional law cases. Cleveland provided numerous examples of international law references 
in the Constitution, both when discussing “offenses against the law of nations” and the power to 
enter into treaties and other agreements with foreign nations. The law of nations “is now loosely 
translated as customary international law”20 and with that it seems that Cleveland has been able 
to trace the use of international norms directly to the formation and language of the Constitution. 
This, obviously, is a strong argument against Scalia’s categorization of “the first use of foreign 
sources”, not to mention his beliefs in how the Constitution should be read and used by the 
courts. There have been similar studies to Cleveland’s that have been done using court opinions 
dating back to the opinions of Chief Justice John Marshall in the early nineteenth century. In an 
opinion written for a case stemming from the War of 1812, Chief Justice John Marshall 
reflected, “In expounding [the] Constitution, a construction ought not lightly to be admitted 
                                                 
19 Cleveland, supra 17 at 12 
20 Id (citing Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Jus Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129, 132-33 (2005) 
at 135; see also Louis Henkin, A Century of Chinese Exclusion, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 n.2 (1987); see also Mark 
Westin Janis, The American Tradition of International Law: Great Expectations 1789-1914, at 1-24 (2004); see also 
Edwin Dickenson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the Unted States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26,26-
33 (1952).) 
  
 -10- 
which would give to a declaration of war an effect in this country it does not possess 
elsewhere.”21 
 With significant evidence of the use of international norms in the jurisprudence of 
Supreme Court justices, both past and present, the question arises not of if they are used but if 
they should be used. I will explore the justifications for both sides of the debate later in this 
paper. I would argue, however, that on either side of the issue there is a common concern that if 
international norms are applied, it not be in an arbitrary manner. Chief Justice Roberts argues 
that being allowed to cite foreign practice allows the members of the court “to incorporate his or 
her own personal preferences, [and] cloak them with the authority of precedent.”22  He 
summarizes the concern of many opponents of the use of international law when he said: 
 
 [R]elying on foreign precedent doesn’t confine judges. It doesn’t limit their discretion the 
way relying on domestic precedent does…Foreign law, you can find anything you want. 
If you don’t find it in the decisions of France or Italy, it’s in the decisions of Somalia or 
Japan or Indonesia, or wherever. As somebody said in another context, looking at foreign 
law for support is like looking out over a crowd and picking out your friends. You can 
find them. They’re there. 23 
 
This norm shopping that Roberts is describing is not dissimilar to the court shopping done by 
defendants and plaintiffs alike. It is, rightly so, almost an abuse of international norms that 
common knowledge would suggest was not intended by those who first started using 
international consensus to justify decisions. Scalia is been quoted several times as criticizing the 
Court “for selectively citing foreign sources that support its views while ignoring practices 
                                                 
21 Cleveland, supra 8 
22 Parrish, Austen L. "Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court's Use of Foreign Law." 2007. University of 
Illinois Law Review . Vol 2007 No. 2 at 651 (citing Court in Transition: From the Hearings, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 
2005, at A26; see also Edwin Meese III, Commentary: Supreme Choice…with Encore, Wash. Times, Sept.23, 2005, 
at A21) 
23 Court in Transition: From the Hearings, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 2005, at A26 
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abroad that contradict our constitutional norms.”24 When does the application of international 
norms become a fishing expedition for laws in other countries that support a justice’s point of 
view while ignoring the laws that admonish it? 
 Abortion is an excellent example of a case of individual rights with no finite national or 
international consensus. International laws stemming from the establishment of treaties, UN 
resolutions, and global customs have historically steered away from the issue, leaving it up to the 
individual countries. This leaves the justices with a myriad of laws from one country to the next 
that have essentially no binding characteristics. The laws on the books in individual countries are 
from one extreme to the other, ranging from the forbiddance of the practice to very liberal 
abortion laws. Many examples can be provided where countries have much stricter abortion laws 
than those of the United States while “most advanced industrial democracies broadly protect 
abortion rights.”25 It hardly seems fair to assert that the laws of some countries have more 
bearing than the laws of other countries. It is argued, therefore, that international norms can not 
be used at all because doing so would automatically show favor to those states that support a 
justice’s opinion while ignoring and in effect shunning those states that go against it.  
The same goes for the justification of abortion laws based on national opinion. Several 
Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Roe v. Wade have stated that there is a growing national 
consensus against a certain type of abortion or abortive practice. The fact of the matter is, 
however, that if there were a strong enough national consensus the courts would not have to 
practice judicial activism because the legislature would be passing laws repudiating or affirming 
abortion rights. Justices citing a national consensus for the limiting of abortion rights send the 
message that there is a group of people in the United States whose opinion matters more than 
                                                 
24 Cleveland, supra 8 
25 Id 
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that of another group. Furthermore, this type of justification affords no protection to this minority 
because, unless overturned by the justices themselves, the decision stands as law. 
Abortion is not the only contentious issue that justices have used to illustrate the apparent 
absurdity of international norms. Trial by jury and the restriction of women’s rights have also 
been used to argue against this practice. Justice Scalia participated in a debate during the appeal 
of the juvenile death penalty case Roper v. Simmons when this very subject was brought up. It 
was asserted that the trend against executing juveniles was extremely pervasive. Justice Scalia 
responded that most of the world does not allow for trial by jury. “Should we yield to the rest of 
the world on that practice as well?”26 His response strikes at the core of the debate over the use 
of international norms in American jurisprudence. Since there is no systematic way to assign 
international norms and these norms vary from issue to issue, it is argued that they are an 
improper means for determining national law. 
 Before going into an in depth examination of the arguments for and against the use of 
international norms, the ultimate question one might have is why the debate is important. Why 
are people writing about this, why is it a problem, why should the average American care? 
Alexis de Tocqueville once said, “Scarcely a political question arises in the United States that is 
not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial decision.”  The United States has, since it’s founding, 
been engaged in a debate over the use of international norms in determining public policy. 
Through its individual decisions, the courts have contributed a great deal to the national policies 
of the United States as well as the nation’s attitudes towards foreign policy. The Supreme 
Court’s assumption of this role has been facilitated by several circumstances. Because so many 
important legal questions come through its docket, the Supreme Court has the opportunity to 
                                                 
26 Mauro, Tony. "High Court Hears Arguments on Executing Juveniles." Law.Com. 14 Oct. 2004. Legal Times. 5 
Feb. 2007 <http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1097686235208>. 
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shape a wide range of policies. In doing so the Court has engaged in a great deal of what is often 
called judicial activism. This practice generally refers to court decisions that make significant 
changes in public policy, particularly in policies established by other institutions.27 
 With so much of today’s public policy focusing on the United States as an international 
actor, it is little wonder that the nine justices on the Supreme Court have continually debated the 
use of international norms when justifying written opinions, both for the majority and the 
minority. This is not a debate, however, that began when the Bush White House transformed its 
foreign policy goals to encompass the idea that the United States should be spreading democracy 
though out the world. The same questions that the courts are wrestling with now were present 
almost two centuries ago. The constant debate over the place of international laws in American 
jurisprudence reflects two fundamentally different attitudes of the United States and its role in 
the international system. Ultimately, the question is where we stand with respect to the rest of the 
world. On the one hand, the public policy arising out of judicial decisions comes from the 
interpretation of our constitution and the inherent independence of our political system from 
those of other societies. On the other hand, our place in the international system is that of a 
leader, in which we must take into account the international consensus when defining our 
policies, policies that we expect the world to embrace. 
 Both of these views are represented in today’s Supreme Court. Justices Antonin Scalia 
and Stephen Breyer are considered to be the most outspoken on the issue, with Thomas and 
Kennedy not far behind. Scalia and Thomas believe that international norms should not be used 
or reflected in our laws. Scalia called “irrelevant” “the practices of the ‘world community,’ 
whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people.”28 Breyer and Kennedy 
                                                 
27 Baum, Lawrence. The Supreme Court. 7th ed. Congressional Quarterly Books, 2000. 185-194. 
28 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
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sharply disagree, arguing that international norms should be used due to the increasing 
globalization and interconnectedness of our world. Former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor agrees 
with Breyer and Kennedy. "International law is a help in our search for a more peaceful world."29 
 Noam Chomsky, a professor and political activist, has said “it is understood that only 
those with the guns can establish ‘norms’ and modify international law.”30  Many in the United 
States subscribe to this view. They feel that until someone can conquer them militarily they can 
create a world that does not account for any existing international laws or norms. Those who 
seek, however, to make an exception and differentiate the American judicial and political system 
from the international community are failing to recognize that the United States is an active 
participant in the formation of the norms and laws it is fighting to ignore.   
In examining the two viewpoints, there are several factors one must take into account. 
Among these are the constitution, its origin, and the place it holds in today’s society. From there 
one can begin to analyze past precedent. Not only has the court made decisions by taking into 
account international law, but the same justification for those decisions is being used in today’s 
opinions. It is important to keep in mind when evaluating the arguments for and against the 
application of international norms that the United States is an active participant in the formation 
of the norms and laws that some are arguing are irrelevant in judicial decision making. 
As stated previously, the debate over the use of the international norms in American 
jurisprudence is not a new one. This is because the root of the debate stems from the right of the 
justices to interpret the Constitution. The tension among the Supreme Court Justices on how to in 
“do their job”, so to speak, has only been intensified, not created, by the debate over the use 
                                                 
29"O'Connor Praises International Law." World Net Daily. 27 Oct. 2004. 3 Mar. 2007 
<http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=41143>. 
30 Chomsky, Noam. "Dominence and Its Dilemmas." Boston Review: a Political and Literary Forum. 2003. 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 5 Mar. 2007 <http://bostonreview.net/BR28.5/chomsky.html>. 
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foreign precedent. The arguments over constitutional interpretation are centered on the question 
of what sources should be taken into account when interpreting the constitution and how much 
weight should these relevant sources of authority be given. This is very similar to the questions 
of international norms and their relevance as justification for judicial opinions. Just as some 
justices argue that a growing international consensus, the global economy, and past precedent 
justify the use of international norms, many others use these same reasons to argue against their 
application. Austen Parrish feels that, largely, “the rejection of the use of foreign materials rests 
on the argument that judges must confine themselves to considering the original intent of the 
Framers when deciding constitutional cases.”31 This line of argument comes in the forms of 
originalist and textualist interpretations of the constitution. Parrish argues that “despite recent 
attempts to resuscitate [these modes of deciding cases], the legal mainstream long ago rejected or 
discounted [them], at least in their extreme forms.”32 
 Parrish’s reference to the attempted revival of originalist interpretation is most likely 
pointing to the outspoken opinion of Justice Antonin Scalia. Among the justices on the Supreme 
Court that put heavy stock in interpreting the constitution using the original intent of the 
Framers, Scalia has become the example used most often to illustrate the practice. This is 
probably because he has been very open about his belief in textualism as well as arguing against 
the use of international norms. Scalia practices what is known as American constitutional 
exceptionalism. When reflecting on the founding of our country and government he urges that “if 
there was any thought absolutely foreign to the founders of our country, surely it was the notion 
that we Americans should be governed the way Europeans are.”33 It is easy to see the historical 
                                                 
31 Parrish, supra 22 at 641 
32 Id at 641 supra 18  
33 Scalia, Justice Antonin. "Outsourcing American Law." American Enterprise Institute. American Enterprise 
Institute, Washington DC. 21 Feb. 2006. 3 Mar. 2007 <http://www.ngowatch.org/articles.php?id=215>. 
  
 -16- 
justification for Scalia’s remarks. What is less known, however, is the immense impact that 
foreign scholars, philosophers, and statesmen had on the Constitution itself. The drafters of the 
Constitution were well versed in international law and intended to use it to take their place 
among the other nations. This is evident through the writings of Thomas Jefferson and John Jay. 
Jay, who was the first chief justice of the United States, stated that “the United States had, by 
taking a place among nations of the earth, become amendable to the laws of nations.”34  
 While recognizing foreign influences in the drafting of the Constitution, opponents for 
the application of international norms stress that once the constitution was signed, it became the 
law of the land and regardless of what influenced its creation, when it became law it became 
beyond reproach. There is an obstacle, however, to using the Constitution as the sole arbitrator of 
modern day law. Justice Scalia has argued, “modern foreign legal materials can never be relevant 
to an interpretation of…the meaning of the U.S. Constitution.”35 But what is the true meaning 
behind the Constitution and how do we interpret it? There are two distinct opinions as to how the 
Constitution should be read. These are, as a living document, or as an unchanging guideline.. 
They have also been referred to as interpretivism and noninterpretivism. 
Interpretivism, otherwise known as originalism, is the principle that judges, in resolving 
constitutional questions, should rely on the express provisions of the Constitution or upon those 
norms that are clearly implicit in its text. This is the approach that emphasizes original intent and 
argues that the leading framers were interpretivists and believed that constitutional questions 
should be reviewed by that approach. There are several forms of originalism that are significant 
when examining the sources used in constitutional interpretation. Perhaps the most “pure” form 
of originalism is known as intentionalism. Intentionalism, or “original intent” theorists, interpret 
                                                 
34Cleveland, supra 8 
35 Id 
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the constitution based on the intention of the framers. They believe that, in reviewing laws, it 
becomes of special importance to take into account the intentions of the authors of the 
Constitution. Intentionalists look at the writing of the Framers to come up with somewhat of a 
guide on how to read the writing in the Constitution. If the Framers all referenced cruel and 
unusual punishment in their other writing, for example, intentionalists would have more than one 
source be able to aid them in the interpretation of the constitution. The same can be said for 
belief systems of the Framers which, while not necessarily explicitly written down, could be 
implicit from their other writings.  
There are several problems with using the originalist approach of intentionalism to 
interpret the Constitution. Some of these problems have been addressed by scholars who have 
asked several important questions that have weakened the argument for intentionalism. The first 
is that, assuming that intentions of the Framers could be found in their other writings, it is 
unclear that there is one common intention presented in the Constitution. As we know from the 
notes taken at the Philadelphia convention, there were very lively debates over specific language 
used in the Constitution. Many scholars argue that this is a clear indication that one intent cannot 
be found and that, for this reason, the originalist’s use of intent as a means of constitutional 
interpretation is flawed. Another problem is that, assuming one intention was present in the 
Constitution at the time of its creation, the justices who practice originalism have no guarantee 
that they will be able to correctly identify this intention and apply it to modern day 
jurisprudence. It is for these reasons that intentionalism, perhaps the most extreme form of 
originalism, has been “widely critiqued as unrealistic and unworkable.”36  
In response to the criticism of intentionalism as a means of interpreting the constitution, 
originalists have adapted to a new understanding of originalism focusing on the “meaning” of the 
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Constitution. These texualists, as they are commonly referred to, are “originalists who give 
primary weight to the text and structure of the Constitution.  Textualists are often skeptical of the 
ability of judges to determine collective ‘intent.’”37 The fact that they give “primary weight” to 
the text and structure of the Constitution is an important point when analyzing the interpretative 
approach of textualists.  Nicholas Zeppos has found through his analysis of citation patterns that 
the Court has never subscribed to a “strict originalist methodology.”38 Rather, he says, “the 
Court’s approach is eclectic, relying not only on text and originalist sources, but on practical 
considerations and other dynamic sources as well.”39 It is with this in mind that textualists 
approach the interpretation of the constitution, not with the idea of deriving its original intent, 
but rather with the practical goal of distorting its meaning as little as possible. This method of 
constitutional interpretation, rather than strict original intentionalism, more closely mirrors the 
practices of Scalia. In an address to the Catholic University of America, Scalia made the 
distinction between intentionalism and what he identifies as his interpretive methodology. 
 
"The theory of originalism treats a constitution like a statute, and gives it the 
meaning that its words were understood to bear at the time they were promulgated. You 
will sometimes hear it described as the theory of original intent. You will never hear me 
refer to original intent, because as I say I am first of all a textualist, and secondly an 
originalist. If you are a textualist, you don't care about the intent, and I don't care if the 
framers of the Constitution had some secret meaning in mind when they adopted its 
words. I take the words as they were promulgated to the people of the United States, and 
what is the fairly understood meaning of those words."40 
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This seems to be a straightforward and natural way of interpreting the Constitution. It is certainly 
accepted by the vast majority of scholars that originalism, specifically textualism, is an important 
aspect of interpretation. “Virtually all Constitutional scholars agree that the specific intentions of 
the Framers count for something and that sometimes the text can be decisive.”41 We are left, 
then, with those inevitable instances when the text is not decisive. It could be inferred by Scalia’s 
choice of textualism that he believes original meaning can be found in every phrase of the 
Constitution. As scholars have pointed out, however, this is not necessarily the case. Alexander 
M. Bickel has questioned whether “Constitutional language like ‘equality’ and ‘liberty’ even had 
a fixed meaning from which to derive original understanding.”42 
 So if not originalism, what? Judicial opponents of originalism as the only method of 
interpreting the constitution don’t believe they are bound solely by the original intent, textual 
meaning, and structure of the constitution. This philosophical belief regarding the interpretation 
of the constitution has been labeled as noninterpretivism. Noninterpretists appreciate the value in 
looking to the original text of the Constitution but feel that there are other very important sources 
that must be consulted when deciding the constitutionality of a specific law or situation. While 
the Framers produced a document that is very helpful to the formation of laws, noninterpretivists 
recognize that they could not have possibly accounted for the evolution of society in any specific 
way. Noninterpretivism “allows the Constitution to evolve to match [a] more enlightened 
understandings on matters.”43 It recognizes the Constitution to be a living document. The 
methodology of noninterpretivism, often referred to as judicial gap-filling, allows for the 
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consultation of a vast array of sources, including but not limited to “text, intent, precedent, 
history, structure, value, and pragmatic consequences.”44 
 There are several different forms of noninterpretivism, just as there are degrees of 
originalism. Perhaps the most prominent of these is contextualism. Contextualism, while it is 
concerned with the original text of the Constitution, seeks to interpret it by looking at a broad 
picture of the context in which the law or decision was promulgated. This broad context invites 
the use of a historical basis on which to decide matters related to the Constitution. 
Noninterpretivism asserts that the meaning of the constitutional text and the intention of the 
framers can not be ascertained with the sufficient precision needed to guide constitutional 
decision making in today’s world. It is, therefore, necessary to take into account past precedent, 
growing consensuses, the evolving standards of decency, and the general evolution of society 
when interpreting the Constitution. Noninterpretivists’ main argument centers on the idea that 
blindly following intentions of the past doesn’t deal with the needs of contemporary society.45 
The assertion is strengthened by the idea touched on earlier in the paper that often, the intentions 
of the past are not known. Just as using modern legal materials to interpret the Constitution 
might seem subjective to some, so is the idea of finding a “true” meaning in the actual text. Paul 
W. Kahn, through his research on constitutions, has concluded that it is not often the case that 
provisions “have a single, definite meaning in any community prior to the process of 
interpretation.”46 This view seems to suggest that the process of interpretation is what gives a 
text meaning and if this is true, interpretation must be based on other things but the text itself.  
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“[A constitution’s meaning is] not a thing waiting to be discovered by a judge. It 
only has an identifiable shape after the judge articulates the conclusion of an 
interpretative inquiry…. [I]t is not possible for a judge-or anyone else- to consider the 
meaning of [constitution language] without drawing on a wealth of experiences, 
arguments, and values that range across local, national, and even international 
communities.”47 
 
The position of Kahn largely supports Zeppos’ argument that nothing can be interpreted by 
absolute originalism.48 The question then arises of where to draw the line. If pure originalism 
cannot be accomplished, what sources does the originalist feel are compatible with their idea of 
constitutional interpretation? It seems obvious that any answer to this question is highly 
subjective and could be qualified in any number of different ways.  
Much of the debate stems from the practice of judicial activism. Judicial activism 
generally refers to court decisions that make significant changes in public policy, particularly in 
policies established by other institutions.49 Since so many policy issues eventually find their way 
into the courts, the sources used in judicial decision making are of extreme importance when 
considering judicial activism. One concern is that noninterpretivism allows for the importation of 
personal preferences into the decision making process instead of relying solely on the 
constitution. This is closely related to the idea that citing foreign precedent in American legal 
decisions allows judges to “troll deeply...in the world’s corpus juris’ to reach a politically 
preferred outcome.”50 While is it commonly believed that noninterpretive practices invite more 
decisions based on the personal views of the justices themselves, research has shown that “there 
is simply no value-neutral way to choose among possible specifications of the Framers’ abstract 
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intent.”51 Anthony Cook argues that “original understanding [is] no more than an artifice for 
imposing [the judge’s] own political vision…”52 
It is generally thought that originalists, if they are to influence or change policy, can fall 
back on the justification that the policy reflects the text and intent of the framers. It has been 
argued that this is not the case, however, for noninterpretivists who have gone outside the 
constitution when engaging in judicial activism. For example, it has become a concern that 
because of the influence of international norms, policies are no longer free of foreign influence 
and therefore, threaten our freedom. “Citation to foreign law sources has become synonymous 
with judicial activism, sometimes eliciting shrill claims of an out-of-control Court.”53 Often in 
determining what sources should be consulted, originalists appeal to the use of “American 
sources” and tend to shy away from the use of foreign practice, precedent, etc. This argument 
stems from the idea that the citation of international norms is a new phenomenon. As previously 
argued in the paper, this is simply not the case. While it is a tendency among originalists to view 
international practices as not relevant to our constitutional interpretation, Parrish points out that 
“originalism struggles to explain why citation to foreign sources must be banned in constitutional 
decision making.”54  
 I would argue that the originalist’s rejection of foreign legal materials and laws as an 
appropriate source for constitutional interpretation is a rather unconvincing one. Because the 
original intent for most, if not all, of the Constitutional text is not obvious, the originalist must 
rely on other sources for constitutional interpretation. While the noninterpretivist allows for a 
generous library of sources, the originalists limit themselves to those they deem “relevant” in 
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preserving the original meaning of the constitution. This seems to be very ambiguous and highly 
subjective but most seem to be together on their rejection of foreign sources and influence. It is 
my opinion that this is because the word “foreign” is used as a trigger word, if you will. While 
they (the originalists) find it hard to articulate exactly what goes into their interpretation of the 
constitution, surely it would seem that we are sovereign and that we are not bound by foreign 
influence. From this, I would argue, that the originalist sees any citation of international norms as 
binding the American people to a set of beliefs that we as “free” people, should not be bound by. 
It is in this way that the originalists treat foreign citations superficially, rejecting them solely 
because they did not originate as part of the American tradition and, because of this, should have 
no binding influence. They make the mistake of treating all foreign materials as if the use of 
them would be to endanger American sovereignty rather than to inform judicial opinion. “At 
times, the criticism has had a xenophobic tone to it, playing on ‘exaggerated fears: fear of foreign 
domination, fear of judicial activism, fear of the unknown.’”55 
 Just as the differing views on constitutional interpretation shape the way in which one 
supports or rejects the use of international norms, so does the way the justices view the 
sovereignty of America and its interdependence on the world community. It seems to follow that 
certain philosophical beliefs on constitutional interpretation, namely those of textualism and 
intentionalism, tend to hold a view of American sovereignty sacred over any inclination that we 
as a country should associate ourselves with foreign precedent. There is a tension between this 
school of thought and those who reference the globalization of the modern world as a 
justification for the citation of international norms. In general, it is noninterpretivist judges who 
believe one must take into account the opinions and practices of the world community. As 
Justice Stephen Breyer articulated in a debate with Justice Antonin Scalia over foreign law, 
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“…we live in a world where I think it’s out of date for people to teach about foreign law in a 
course called ‘foreign law.’”56 Many are of the same opinion as Justice Breyer. It would seem 
nearly impossible to be as educated as the Supreme Court Justices are and not have a concept of 
today’s society that encompasses an understanding of the larger world community. While I 
would venture to say that all the Justices on the Supreme Court today would agree they are well 
aware of foreign precedent, it is the use of that knowledge when deciding American legal issues 
that proves to be a very contentious issue in American jurisprudence. While Justice Scalia has 
categorically denied the importance of foreign sources in shaping our laws, Justice Breyer argues 
that “things outside the United States [can] be relevant to an understanding of how to apply the 
American Constitution.”57 It would seem, then, as if one might have to choose between what 
Scalia feels is the sovereignty of the United States and the idea that we can no longer ignore the 
views of the world of which we are a part. 
 Interestingly enough, the arguments for the use of international norms in American 
jurisprudence are inextricably tied to our own views of foreign policy as well as our interactions 
with other countries. At the risk of getting involved in a discussion over the foreign policy during 
these last eight years, one cannot help but see the irony in the denial of foreign precedent as a 
factor in judicial decision making. It seems that for all of the “vitriolic responses from Justice 
Scalia and, sometimes, Justice Thomas”58, we as a people have a very different response when it 
is our norms that we expect the world to follow. While we purport to know what is best for the 
world community, we have a very negative reaction to the idea that the world community might 
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have some say in what is best for us as a nation. This fear of foreign domination has played itself 
out through the debate over the use of international norms in American jurisprudence.  
 Roger P. Alford, in his paper Misusing International Sources to Interpret the 
Constitution, argues that limits should be in place regarding the application of international law 
to the interpretation of the United States’ Constitution. He feels that “[u]sing global opinions as a 
means of constitutional interpretation dramatically undermines sovereignty.”59 Similarly, Jeremy 
Rabkin of Cornell University argues that foreign nations are actively attempting to influence 
court decisions, with a goal to undermine the sovereignty of the United States. Testifying at a 
Congressional hearing on House Resolution 568, he argued that the European Union “is really 
set on…undermining American sovereignty” by “infiltrate[ing] into our judicial system this idea 
that our judges need to listen to what their judges say.”60 The point that these scholars are trying 
to make is that the implementation of laws in the U.S., the justification for which are laws in 
other countries, undermines our independence. The argument is centered on the idea that if 
foreign actors play a role in the making of our laws, there becomes a discrepancy in 
accountability. In the United States, when a bill is passed and is signed into law, the American 
people are able to hold the legislature accountable for the law, insofar as they elect the people 
who drafted and enacted it. In the case of court decisions that interpret the laws, the Judges are 
not elected by the people. Furthermore, “the use of foreign law ‘surrenders U.S. sovereignty to 
non-U.S. decision-makers’ who are not accountable to the people of the United States.”61 
 Opponents of this view, those that feel that the sovereignty of the United States is not 
threatened by the use of international references, offer several arguments for their position. 
Parrish argues that “the suggestion [that U.S. sovereignty is threatened] confuses the use of 
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foreign law as an interpretative aid with presuming that foreign law is controlling. Citing 
research done by David S. Law, he suggests that any accusation that the courts are “using foreign 
sources for something more than persuasive authority”62 is based off of pure speculation. This 
makes sense when one considers the nature of the way in which the Supreme Court justifies their 
decisions. How would any person, let alone the Supreme Court Justices, separate their 
knowledge of foreign law from the influence that knowledge has over their jurisprudence? 
Justice Scalia has said “that judges should read foreign legal materials as much as they want, but 
just not put the citations in the opinions.”63 It seems to me that, if this were the case, one of two 
things would happen. Either an opinion would be riddled with reasoning that is justified through 
the use of international precedent and is just not noted, or the opinion would properly cite the 
reasoning behind it’s decision and therefore, upset those that feel foreign influence has no place 
in American jurisprudence.  
Scalia’s suggestion that the problem of foreign influence would be mitigated if foreign 
sources were not cited is a superficial fix to the problem. For, just because foreign influence is 
not cited does not mean it does not drive the opinion’s reasoning, subconsciously or otherwise. 
Scalia seems to suggest that one can actively partition knowledge we have acquired and make 
certain that it does not affect any part of our reasoning apparatus. I think most would agree this is 
simply not the case. Whether we agree to ban the explicit use of foreign sources, I would argue 
that it is impossible to control the implicit use of them. This idea is mirrored in Alexander 
Aleinikoff’s Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transitional Law and the U.S. Constitution. 
He argues that the fear of sovereignty loss “starts with an unrealistic view of states as 
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hermetically sealed polities exercising sole jurisdiction over their territory and people.”64 The 
idea that the United States is completely immune from foreign influence is, just as Aleinikoff 
states, unrealistic. Even the documents that the United States are founded on are historically 
known to foreign influence. Parrish points out the fact that the debate over the use of foreign 
sources is somewhat backwards. “To the extent that the lines between the domestic and the 
foreign have blurred, it has occurred already.”65 It should not necessarily be a concern about 
keeping foreign sources out of the United States, but rather about how to remove them since they 
are already present. When the debate shifts to this question, it becomes harder to justify a 
position in which there is no foreign influence in the United States. The new argument, one could 
imagine, would be how to limit any further foreign influence. 
 The sovereignty argument takes another form in Sarah H. Cleveland’s article Our 
International Constitution. She argues that the “primary objection raised to consideration of 
international law in constitutional interpretation is that the practice suffers from a democracy 
deficit.”66 The key feature of this objection is the classic countermajoritarian concern. Cleveland 
cites the argument of Alexander Bickel to expound on this point. He identifies the 
countermajoritarian concern in describing judicial review as the power to interpret the 
Constitution “against the wishes of a legislative majority.”67 This is similar to the above 
argument against the use of foreign sources, namely that the citizens can’t hold anyone 
accountable for a decision based on foreign law. Cleveland finds fault in this argument, stating 
that “to the extent that the Constitution imposes limits on legislative decision-making though 
individual rights provisions and the structures of federal and separation of powers, judicial 
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enforcement of those rights and relationships is necessarily nonmajoritarian.”68 This practice is 
in place regardless if the law contains foreign influences or not. For that reason, the 
countermajoritarian concern regarding the use of foreign law is “readily rebutted.”69 
 While differences in methods of constitutional interpretation and the sovereignty 
argument are both key features of the debate over the use of international norms, much of the 
discussion revolves around the relationship between human rights and constitutional rights. 
Gerald L. Neuman, in his paper entitled The Uses of International Law in Constitutional 
Interpretation, argues that “the postwar development of international human rights law has 
widened the field for interaction between international law and constitutional interpretation.”70 
He points to international human rights treaties as the catalyst for this interaction. When these 
treaties were signed, they required implementation. The method of implementation, however, 
was left up to the signatories. Neuman suggests that while “legislative enforcement of the treaties 
would be sufficient” and the treaties don’t “mandate implementation through cooperative 
constitutional interpretation”, the system of enforcing international human rights has been largely 
played out in the courts.71  
 The fact that the legal system in the U.S has often cited international law and treaties 
could be explained by an appeal to function. The function of both the U.S. court system as well 
as international human rights treaties is to protect the rights of a human being. Because both of 
these systems are charged with protecting the same rights, it is natural that they would overlap. 
The problem that this overlap creates is concisely identified by Neuman. “Juxtaposing the 
constitutional and international systems with regard to a right that they both protect (such as 
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freedom of expression, or fair trial) multiplies the possibilities for competing influences on the 
interpretation of the right.”72 It seems as though this argument with reference to human rights 
laws is mirrored by the argument for and against methods of constitutional interpretation. It is the 
charge of the Originalists that using supplemental sources in constitutional interpretation has the 
consequence of “muddying the waters” when it comes to deciphering the intentions of the 
framers. By looking to other sources, it increases the probability that one will be able to find a 
justification for their opinion that is different from what the constitutional language would 
explicitly or implicitly prescribe. This same argument, in a different form, is what Neuman 
points out (as quoted above). By having several systems by which to secure a human right, the 
ways in which to justify the securing of it increase exponentially.  
Furthermore, it would seem that the justification that a justice chooses to employ in his 
jurisprudence of human rights would be arbitrary in the sense that they could cite any one 
specific source or all of the sources that could possibly contain the justification. Using the 
example from above, the justification for defending a person’s right to a fair trial could come 
from the U.S. Constitution as well as an international human rights treaty. To the extent that a 
justice chooses to use one or the other as background for their decision would seem to implicate 
them as favoring either the Constitution or the treaty, respectively. But it does not follow that a 
citation referencing an international treaty ignores the Constitution and vice versa. I believe this 
is a powerful argument to mitigate the possible problems that come with the use of international 
sources. The opponents of the practice argue that the justification for a decision needs to be 
found in the U.S. Constitution but it does not follow, as they might have one think, that any 
justification using international sources cannot be found in the constitution as well. It could be 
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that the international example was the more obvious and straightforward explanation for a 
certain decision. 
An important point to take from Neuman’s paper is that it deals primarily with the 
interaction between countries’ constitutions and international treaties. While the nature of this 
interaction is certainly noted in the debate over the use of international norms, the main point of 
contention deals with the use of independent foreign sources, independent meaning that the U.S. 
has not signified their approval of them by signing on to enforce them. It could be argued that the 
use of international treaties in justificatory language is less contentious because the elected 
officials in the government of the United States have condoned them. This is not the case with 
foreign law, foreign precedent, and international consensuses that are cited in judicial opinions. 
The sovereignty argument explored above makes this point when discussing the 
countermajoritarian concern.  
While many argue that the use of foreign norms as justification for U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions is simply unacceptable, one of the strongest arguments for foreign citation comes from 
the nature of the treaties themselves. Perhaps the reason why so many countries, diverse in 
economies, ethnicities, governments and societal structures, are all able to sign onto treaties 
dealing with human rights is that there is some common ground that opponents of the use of 
international norms do not want to recognize. This common ground that reaches across cultural 
and geographic barriers is the idea that human life, whether male or female, young or old, 
American or African or Middle Eastern, is essentially of value in and of itself. It is for this reason 
that it becomes hard for some justices to ignore the fact that a majority of countries treat life 
issues one way or another. By life issues I mean those issues, such as abortion or capital 
punishment, that have some impact on the life of an individual. By impact I mean that the issue 
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in question would have some affect on the quality of life of the individual or, more directly, have 
some affect on if the individual could continue to live. Specifically, capital punishment cases are 
often decided on the basis of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. It seems as though 
these death penalty cases are often at the forefront of the debate over the use of international 
norms. Many have argued that the use of international norms in these cases is due to the nature 
of what is being decided, since human life exists in all countries, irrespective of a country’s 
politics, religions, cultures, or ethnic backgrounds. 
 As stated in the introduction, however, while the use of international norms is certainly 
not something new to judicial interpretation, it is now a frequent topic of scholarly writing on 
American jurisprudence as well as discussions of the jurisprudence of specific justices. As I have 
already expounded, in the other parts of this paper, on the scholarly analysis of this topic, I feel it 
is now important to go directly to the opinions of the court. Not only will these opinions give 
insight into the exact reasoning of the justices, but it will also aid in predicting future outcomes 
of cases dealing with issues of life and the citation of foreign sources. I have chosen five cases, 
spanning over a period of 20 years, which have explicitly referenced the appropriate or 
inappropriate use of international norms or how to determine a societal consensus when deciding 
the constitutionality of a death sentence imposed on an individual. Three cases involve a death 
sentence imposed on a minor and two cases involve a death sentence imposed on a mentally 
retarded individual. The five cases were chosen because of their consistent appearance in 
constitutional law books referencing important death penalty cases that were decided by the 
Supreme Court. Also, scholarly writing identified these cases as important in the debate over the 
use of international norms. These cases are Thompson v. Oklahoma73, Penry v. Lynaugh74, 
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Stanford v. Kentucky75, Atkins v. Virginia76, and Roper v. Simmons77. An explanation of each 
case, as well as a brief analysis of the opinions, is below.  
 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) 
  
William Wayne Thompson, at the age of 15, was convicted of murder in the first degree 
for the death of his ex brother in law. He had been tried as an adult and was sentenced to death. 
His case was appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, where the lower court’s 
decision was affirmed. Upon appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the case was granted a writ of 
certiorari. The question being considered in this case was whether or not the execution of a 15 
year old violated the Eight Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The 
court, in answering this question, found in favor of the petitioner. Having noted that the Eighth 
Amendment applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the court deemed the 
execution of persons under the age of 16 unconstitutional. In explaining their decision, the court 
took notice of the state laws against the execution of someone under the age of 16, as well as an 
evolving standard of decency that could be identified as being against the execution of such 
persons. 
 
The court, in its plurality opinion, addressed the citation of foreign sources of law when 
developing a barometer for standards of decency. While is had previously made use of 
international and foreign materials, “the Supreme Court moved its consideration of foreign law 
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from the footnotes…to the text of the [opinion], written by Justice Stevens.”78 The opinion 
stated: 
The conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of decency to execute a person 
who was less than 16 years old at the time of his or her offense is consistent with the 
views that have been expressed by respected professional organizations, by other nations 
that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western 
European community.79 
 
 In the footnote associated with the above quote, Stevens qualifies his findings with 
several cases in which the court has “previously recognized the relevance of the views of the 
international community in determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.”80 The court, 
with this opinion, “revisited foreign sources of law in striking down a state criminal statute.”81 
This practice, as Calabresi and Zimdahl point out, had its beginnings in Trop v Dulles.82 As 
mentioned above, Scalia had identified Trop as the first opinion employing the use of foreign 
sources in jurisprudence.  
 Justice Scalia wrote the dissenting opinion in Thompson. He was joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice White. The dissent took issue with the plurality’s reference to international 
norms and laws, stating that the determination of law should take stock of our views and 
practices, not those of the rest of the world.83 
 
But where there is not first a settled consensus among our own people, the views of other 
nations, however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be 
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imposed upon Americans through the Constitution. In the present case, therefore, the fact 
that a majority of foreign nations would not impose capital punishment upon persons 
under 16 at the time of the crime is of no more relevance than the fact that a majority of 
them would not impose capital punishment at all, or have standards of due process quite 
different from our own.84 
 
These, along with several other parts of the opinion and dissent, deal directly with the use of 
international norms in American jurisprudence. While Justice O’Connor concurred with no 
reference to foreign law, “Thompson [is an] Eighth Amendment decision that is founded upon 
foreign sources of law.”85 
 
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) 
 
Almost one year after handing down the decision in Thompson, the court partially 
confirmed and partially reversed a lower court’s decision regarding the sentence imposed on 
Johnny Paul Penry. Penry was a mentally retarded individual with the intelligence of a 9 or 10 
year old.  He was tried, convicted of murder, and was given the death penalty. A writ of 
certiorari was granted. The court was to consider two questions. The first was whether Penry’s 
death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment due to the fact that the jury in his original trial 
was not instructed that it could take into account mitigating evidence (i.e. his limited mental 
capacity) when imposing its sentence. The second question the court was to consider was 
whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited his execution, based on the fact that he was mentally 
retarded. 
The opinion overturned the lower court’s decision and remanded the matter for further 
proceedings because they found that the jury was not “able to consider and give effect to all of 
Penry’s mitigating evidence in answering the special issues without any jury instructions on 
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mitigating evidence.”86 As for the second question, the court found that the execution of Penry 
did not violate the Eighth Amendment because he was found competent to stand trial. 
Addressing the more broad question of whether or not it would violate the Eighth Amendment to 
execute any mentally retarded person, the court found that it would not because of the varying 
degrees of competence a mentally retarded person could have. In other words, they found that 
there was no basis to generalize that all mentally retarded persons lacked the competence to be 
held accountable for their crimes.  
  The opinion and subsequent partial concurrences and dissents do not engage in a debate 
over the use of international citation. I would argue this is because the only reference to foreign 
law in O’Connor’s opinion is common law. Because it is widely accepted that our Constitution is 
based off of principles of English law, in determining the meaning of the Constitution it is not 
objectionable to look to the sources that informed it. Scalia, an originalist in terms of 
Constitutional interpretation, has condoned the reference to common law under the auspices that 
it would be helpful in illuminating the intentions of the Framers. O’Connor avoids the use of 
international citation in this opinion, just as she had in the Thompson concurrence a year earlier. 
 There are a few things in the opinion, however, that I did find interesting with reference 
to the use of international norms. First, there were ample opportunities within the opinion to cite 
foreign law and practices with regard to the execution of mentally retarded persons. The defense 
claimed that there was “objective evidence…of an emerging national consensus against the 
execution of the mentally retarded…”87 Penry argued that is reflected the “evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”88 This same argument in the Thompson 
decision seemed to open the floodgates, so to speak, for referencing foreign law and practice. In 
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Penry, however, none of the Justices touched on the subject of international citation. This could 
be due to the difference in authorship between the two opinions. Or it could be a worry among 
the justices that involving foreign sources in yet another aspect of the application of the death 
penalty would cause a greater upheaval among politically minded people than they were willing 
to handle.  
 This brings me to my next point. Justice O’Connor says that when considering the 
application of the death penalty to a specific class of offenders, the courts rely largely on 
“objective evidence such as the judgments of legislatures and juries.”89 This in turn, relies 
heavily on the politics of the legislatures. It seems ironic that when deciding questions regarding 
the violation of the Eighth amendment, it would look to the legislature, which has, more recently, 
become very aware of the Court’s use of foreign sources. If it is still the case today that the Court 
looks to the legislature for cues as to what violates the Eighth Amendment, it would seem that 
they would also pay attention when the legislature passes resolutions and holds hearing on the 
use of foreign sources in evaluating the Eighth Amendment. One could argue that the legislature 
is not only giving them cues as to what Americans feel violates the Eighth Amendment, but also 
cues regarding the appropriate sources to consult when the Court is presented with a case such as 
Penry. 
 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)  
 
 The same day the court handed down their opinion on Penry, the case of Stanford v. 
Kentucky was also decided. The Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel 
and unusual punishment was not violated when a state allowed capital punishment to be imposed 
on convicted persons of age 16 or 17. In this case, a Kentucky boy, age 17 years and 4 months, 
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raped, sodomized, and murdered a gas station attendant. The Jefferson District Court in 
Kentucky held a series of hearings to determine if the boy should be tried as an adult. The 
District Court determined that state law allowed for them to try the boy as an adult and 
proceeded to do so. He was convicted of murder, among other charges, and was sentenced to 
death. Upon appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the ruling, thereby rejecting the boy’s 
claim that he had a constitutional right to treatment. The U.S. Supreme Court accepted the case 
on certiorari and affirmed the lower court’s decision.  
 Justice Scalia, writing the opinion for the court, concluded that there was no national 
consensus forbidding a sentence of death to convicted persons of 16 or 17 years of age. Scalia 
remarked “[o]f the 37 States whose laws permit capital punishment, 15 decline to impose it upon 
16-year-old offenders and 12 decline to impose it on 17-year-old offenders. This does not 
establish the degree of national consensus this Court has previously thought sufficient to label a 
particular punishment cruel and unusual.” 90 Furthermore, Scalia asserted that “in determining 
what standards have "evolved," however, we have looked not to our own conceptions of 
decency, but to those of modern American society as a whole.”91 In a footnote to the above 
quote, Scalia makes a pointed reference to the dissenting opinion, stating that they have accepted 
various amici that reference the practices of other countries. He then quotes himself from the 
Thompson decision to emphasize his point. Scalia, with the passage below, leaves little doubt as 
to his feelings regarding the place of foreign sources in American jurisprudence.   
We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive, rejecting 
the contention of petitioners and their various amici (accepted by the dissent, see post at 
389-390) that the sentencing practices of other countries are relevant. While 
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[t]he practices of other nations, particularly other democracies, can be 
relevant to determining whether a practice uniform among our people is 
not merely an historical accident, but rather so "implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty" that it occupies a place not merely in our mores, but, text 
permitting, in our Constitution as well, 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-869, n. 4 (1988) (SCALIA, J., dissenting), 
quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.), they cannot serve 
to establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is accepted among 
our people.92 
Justice Brennan authored the dissent in Stanford, and was joined by Justices Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Stevens. They disagreed with the majority, arguing that executing any person 
who is below the age of 18 constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment. They had several reasons for their opinion, the most relevant to my analysis being 
that the constitutionality of a punishment, such as the death penalty, is not the end but rather the 
beginning of one’s review of contemporary standards of decency. Not only did Brennan disagree 
with the importance Scalia put on the constitutions of the states in terms of their current laws 
regarding the juvenile death penalty, but he saw great relevance in the amici that were submitted 
to the court. Perhaps the most important function of the amici was to inform the justices of the 
norms, practices, and laws of other nations. Not only did the dissent cite U.S. case law 
supporting the use of foreign sources, but Brennan used the amici to build his own argument for 
their use.  
Our cases recognize that objective indicators of contemporary standards of decency in the 
form of legislation in other countries is also of relevance to Eighth Amendment analysis. 
Thompson, supra, at 830-831; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 796, n. 22; Coker, 433 U.S. at 596, n. 
10; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 102, and n. 35. Many countries, of course -- over 50, 
                                                 
92 Id at 369, n.1 
  
 -39- 
including nearly all in Western Europe -- have formally abolished the death penalty, or 
have limited its use to exceptional crimes such as treason. App. to Brief for Amnesty 
International as Amicus Curiae. Twenty-seven others do not in practice impose the 
penalty. Ibid. Of the nations that retain capital punishment, a majority -- 65 -- prohibit the 
execution of juveniles. Ibid. Sixty-one countries retain capital punishment and have no 
statutory provision exempting juveniles, though some of these nations are ratifiers of 
international treaties that do prohibit the execution of juveniles. Ibid. Since 1979, 
Amnesty International has recorded only eight executions of offenders under 18 
throughout the world, three of these in the United States. The other five executions were 
carried out in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Rwanda, and Barbados. In addition to national laws, 
three leading human rights treaties ratified or signed by the United States explicitly 
prohibit juvenile death penalties. Within the world community, the imposition of the 
death penalty for juvenile crimes appears to be overwhelmingly disapproved.93 
 Once again, just as with the Thompson and Penry decisions, O’Connor avoided 
addressing what she takes to be the proper use of international norms in American jurisprudence, 
if any. She does, however, mention in Stanford that referencing American legislatures greatly 
informs our assessment of standards of decency. She does not say anything about using foreign 
laws but at the same time does not make a huge point of keeping our mind on American, as 
Scalia does. It is almost as if she is observing the debate from a distance and is trying to decide 
which side to support.   
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
 
 A little over a decade after Penry was decided, the Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in Atkins v. Virginia. One of the issues before the court in Penry had reappeared, but 
this time the use of foreign sources was being debated in the pages of the opinion, where as a 
decade earlier it was not explicitly mentioned. The court, in deciding Atkins, was deciding 
whether the execution of a mentally retarded person constituted cruel and unusual punishment, 
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prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Daryl Renard Atkins was on trial in Virginia for capital 
murder, among other crimes. The defense in his case called witnesses who testified that Atkins 
was mildly mentally retarded. The jury sentenced Atkins to death but the Supreme Court of 
Virginia ordered another sentencing hearing because an incorrect form had been used at the first 
hearing. The same witness testified again as to Atkins’ mental capacity but this time the state 
was able to counter. Despite the second hearing, the sentence was the same and Atkins was again 
sentenced to death. In an appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court relied heavily on the finding in 
Penry v. Lynaugh and affirmed the lower courts ruling, rejecting Atkins’ argument that he could 
not be sentenced to death because he was mentally retarded.  
 The U.S. Supreme Court heard the case and in a 6 to 3 opinion delivered by Justice 
Stevens, the Court overturned its previous ruling in Penry and held that the execution of a 
mentally retarded person was, in fact, cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth 
Amendment. Not only did the Court find that a significant number of states were no longer 
practicing the execution of mentally retarded persons, but also that the deterrence factor present 
in most death sentences was not present in the case of a mentally retarded person due to their 
diminished capacity. While there are many complex issues surrounding this case, from an 
international law perspective this case “highlights not only the differences in opinions of the 
Rehnquist Court Justices regarding the execution of the mentally retarded, but also regarding the 
Supreme Court’s citation and use of foreign laws.”94 
 Unlike ten years prior when the Court heard Penry, Steven’s argued that a national 
consensus had formed against the execution of mentally retarded persons and that the practice 
was “truly unusual.”95 Along with evidence gathered from the states concerning their practices 
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and justifying a belief that a national consensus had formed, a footnote at the end of that section 
referenced numerous amici, both from U.S. and foreign organizations, which seemed to support 
a national consensus by also showing that there was a strong international consensus. The 
footnote referencing this is below. 
 
Additional evidence makes it clear that this legislative judgment reflects a much broader 
social and professional consensus. For example, several organizations with germane 
expertise have adopted official positions opposing the imposition of the death penalty 
upon a mentally retarded offender. In addition, representatives of widely diverse religious 
communities in the United States, reflecting Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and Buddhist 
traditions, have filed an amicus curiae brief explaining that even though their views about 
the death penalty differ, they all “share a conviction that the execution of persons with 
mental retardation cannot be morally justified.” Moreover, within the world community, 
the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders 
is overwhelmingly disapproved. Although these factors are by no means dispositive, their 
consistency with the legislative evidence lends further support to our conclusion that 
there is a consensus among those who have addressed the issue.96 
 
 The various citations for the above argument include amici from the European Union and 
the Catholic Conference. These direct citations to foreign sources go “beyond our nation’s 
borders”97 and are precisely what have Justices Scalia and Rehnquist concerned in their dissents. 
Scalia, in his dissent, reamed the majority opinion for referencing foreign sources that have been, 
according to Rehnquist, “explicitly rejected”98 as having any relevance to the practices of 
America. When Parrish talks about the vitriolic responses from Justice Scalia, perhaps the 
quotation below from Atkins is what he is referencing. 
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But the Prize for the Court’s Most Feeble Effort to fabricate “national consensus” must 
go to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a footnote) to the views of assorted professional 
and religious organizations, members of the so-called “world community,” and 
respondents to opinion polls. I agree with the Chief Justice, that the views of professional 
and religious organizations and the results of opinion polls are irrelevant. Equally 
irrelevant are the practices of the “world community,” whose notions of justice are 
(thankfully) not always those of our people. “We must never forget that it is a 
Constitution for the United States of America that we are expounding. … [W]here there 
is not first a settled consensus among our own people, the views of other nations, 
however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed 
upon Americans through the Constitution.”99  
 
I think it is important to note that it seems as though Stevens was able to make the case 
against executions of mentally retarded persons through data regarding a national consensus, a 
consensus that dissenters most likely wouldn’t object to based solely on its source. It is 
interesting that the majority opinion goes even further, beyond a national consensus, as if to 
make sure that the argument has the power of persuasion. The reason why this is important to 
point out is that a lot of the arguments against the use of international norms focus on the fact 
that the Court is justifying a decision based on foreign sources that have no relevance to the 
people of the United States. I think what is often misunderstood is that the jurisprudence initially 
is based off of our Constitution and/or an American consensus and that the foreign sources are 
used to strengthen the already existing argument, not invent one from scratch.  
 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) 
 
 While it seemed that the debate over the use of international norms in American 
jurisprudence had come to a head in the opinions of Atkins v. Virginia, the opinions written for 
Roper v. Simmons raised awareness of the debate exponentially. The question answered by 
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Roper is whether the execution of a minor violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel 
and unusual punishment and whether it applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Christopher Simmons was sentenced to death in 1993 for the crime of murder, among other 
charges. He was only 17 years old at the time. State and federal appeals of the case lasted until 
2002, each getting rejected. Then, in 2002, the Missouri Supreme Court issued a stay of 
execution for Simmons’ pending the U.S. Supreme Courts decision in Atkins v. Virginia. Citing 
the opinion in Atkins referencing evolving standards of decency and an emerging national 
consensus, the Missouri Supreme Court decided to reconsider Simmons' case. The result was a 
6-3 decision that overturned Simmons’ death sentence. The Missouri Supreme Court argued that 
the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Stanford v. Kentucky was no longer valid, using the 
same arguments that overturned Penry in the Atkins decision. 
The government appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that allowing 
states to make determinations regarding the constitutionality of a national law would be a 
slippery slope, because states could just as easily overturn cases that prohibited action. The 
Supreme Court heard the case and in a 5 to 4 opinion ruled that the execution of minors did 
indeed constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. What makes this 
case unique, besides the journey it took on the way to the Supreme Court, is that “Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion…included a considerable and lengthy discussion of the laws and 
practices of foreign nations as well as international opinions and agreements.”100 For Justice 
Kennedy, “[the] determination that the death penalty [was] disproportionate punishment for 
offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United States [was] the only 
country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”101 The 
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majority opinion considered numerous sources from around the world. While they insisted that 
these sources were not controlling the outcome of the case, the sources provided respected and 
significant confirmation for their conclusions.102 To further support his argument, Kennedy 
reasoned that “…at least from the time of the Court’s decision in Trop, the Court has referred to 
the laws of other countries and to international authorities as instructive for its interpretation of 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments.””103 The majority 
opinion seemed to shame the United States for the fact that they were still executing juveniles up 
until this decision.  
 
“The Court specifically noted that the United States stood alone as an executor of 
juvenile offenders, as each of the seven countries that had executed juveniles since 1990-
Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
China-has since ‘either abolished capital punishment for juveniles or made public 
disavowal of the practice.’”104 
 
In addition to Justice Kennedy’s opinion, Justice Stevens concurred, taking a dig at Scalia and 
pointing out the problem of the inflexibility of original intent.105 
 In response to the majority’s extensive citation to foreign law, Scalia wrote a lengthy 
dissent, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Thomas, in which he decried the majority’s abuse of 
foreign sources.  
 
“[T]he basic premise of the Court’s argument–that American law should conform to the 
laws of the rest of the world–ought to be rejected out of hand… I do not believe that 
approval by “other nations and peoples” should buttress our commitment to American 
principles any more than (what should logically follow) disapproval by “other nations 
and peoples” should weaken that commitment. More importantly, however, the Court’s 
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statement flatly misdescribes what is going on here. Foreign sources are cited today, not 
to underscore our “fidelity” to the Constitution, our “pride in its origins,” and “our own 
[American] heritage.” To the contrary, they are cited to set aside the centuries-old 
American practice–a practice still engaged in by a large majority of the relevant States–of 
letting a jury of 12 citizens decide whether, in the particular case, youth should be the 
basis for withholding the death penalty. What these foreign sources “affirm,” rather than 
repudiate, is the Justices’ own notion of how the world ought to be, and their diktat that it 
shall be so henceforth in America. The Court’s parting attempt to downplay the 
significance of its extensive discussion of foreign law is unconvincing. 
“Acknowledgment” of foreign approval has no place in the legal opinion of this Court 
unless it is part of the basis for the Court’s judgment–which is surely what it parades as 
today.106 
 
The above statement by Scalia is very much in keeping with “his other scathing dissents arguing 
against the use of foreign law in constitutional adjudication.”107 
 Something that one doesn’t immediately realize when reading the opinion is that Justice 
O’Connor writes a separate dissenting opinion in which she takes a stance on the role of 
international norms in American jurisprudence, albeit a hesitant one. While her opinion is in 
dissent of the majority, she speaks rather favorably towards an awareness of the world 
community, at least in could be said in comparison to Scalia.  
 
“[T]his Nation’s evolving understanding of human dignity certainly is neither wholly 
isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, the values prevailing in other countries. On the 
contrary, we should not be surprised to find congruence between domestic and 
international values, especially where the international community has reached clear 
agreement–expressed in international law or in the domestic laws of individual countries–
that a particular form of punishment is inconsistent with fundamental human rights. At 
least, the existence of an international consensus of this nature can serve to confirm the 
reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American consensus.”108 
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Conclusion 
 The justifications for and against the use of international norms are present in the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court Justices. In the opinions authored by Justices Scalia 
and Breyer, the debate over the use of foreign sources seems to mirror the arguments 
presented above. Scalia, in the death penalty cases that were discussed, stressed that an 
originalist interpretation of the Constitution is the best way to protect American 
sovereignty.  This is a combination of the constitutional interpretation and sovereignty 
arguments against the use of international norms. Beyond Justice Scalia’s open rejection 
of citation of foreign sources, one must recognize that other Justices often join his 
majority or dissenting opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist as well as Justice Thomas often 
joined Scalia in touting the use of international norms. In today’s court, the traditional 
constitutionalist approach is taken not only by Justice Scalia and Thomas but also by 
Justices Roberts and Alito. Roberts is quoted above as saying that the citation of foreign 
law allows the justices to impose their own beliefs and preferences on the opinions of the 
court while Alito, in his confirmation hearings, expressed disapproval over the use of 
international norms.  
 It would seem that while these four Justices present strong arguments against the 
citation of international norms, the majority of the court’s Justices recognize the 
importance of, and almost the necessity of, referencing foreign materials in their 
jurisprudence. Breyer, Kennedy, and Stevens have been the most prolific in authoring 
opinions which cite foreign sources, while Justices Ginsburg and Souter often do what 
O’Connor did in the above referenced cases. That is, they join in the opinions written by 
Breyer, Kennedy, or Stevens, and therefore accept citation of foreign sources. Often, this 
acceptance of foreign sources can be attributed to the view of the Constitutional as a 
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“living document” that is subject to interpretation and changes in public opinion. The 
present day argument for the use of international norms in American Jurisprudence is 
also a combination of the human rights justification presented above as well as a twist on 
the sovereignty argument often used by Justice Scalia. They argue that, not only do basic 
human rights transcend political and geographic boundaries, but also that because the 
United States is part of globalization, the sovereignty argument is no longer salient. 
Furthermore, the opinions of the court that cite foreign sources do so in a manner that is 
meant, the Justices argue, to support an already present national consensus, not to 
override one.  
 The more compelling argument, in my opinion, is in support of foreign sources in 
American jurisprudence. It seems as though the nature of our world today does not lend 
itself to an isolationist approach when it comes to constitutional interpretation. With 
increasing globalization, the United States can no longer afford to ignore the practices of 
the rest of the world, practices that often seem more civilized than our own. Particularly 
with the foreign policy objectives championed by the Bush administration, it seems very 
contradictory to invade a foreign county with the intention of “liberating people” when 
the Supreme Court of the United States still has trouble accepting the idea that what other 
countries practice matters to us. I believe there would be a stronger argument for the 
rejection of international sources if it were a consistent policy throughout all branches of 
our government. It is hard, however, to argue that the world should follow our example 
when the courts in the United States are still debating over whether to consider the 
example of others.   
 
